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ABSTRACT Radio frequency identification (RFID) security is a relevant matter. The wide spread of RFID
applications in the general society and the persistent attempts to safeguard it confirm it, especially since its
use involves payments and the store or transmission of sensitive information. In this contribution, we present
an innovative solution for improving the security of RFID passive tags through the use of a screen printed
button, that allows the reception and transmission only when a certain level of physical pressure normal to
its plane is applied. The materials and fabrication technology used demonstrate an easy to implement and
cost-effective system, valuable in several scenarios where the user has straight contact with the tags and
where its usage is direct and intentional.
INDEX TERMS Flexible, force sensor, high-frequency band, pressure, printed electronics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags or systems are
increasingly used in day-to-day situations to provide informa-
tion or handles to information stored elsewhere. In many use
cases, this information stored within the tag can be sensitive;
implying payments, access to restricted zones or privacy
matters. Security concerns arise when not-authorized entities
are able of tracking the location of tags or the person carrying
it, eavesdropping on tag-to-reader communication, misuse
of the information or identity theft through tag cloning [1].
In the case of users carrying RFID-tagged objects, the threat
to people’s privacy relies in companies, governments and
crooks, tracking people without their knowledge and consent;
and potentially exploiting this private information. Criminals
may also fabricate fake products or duplicate identities to take
advantage of its illegal use [2]. Thus, it would be desirable
to add some extra control to the wireless data transfer, while
maintaining it transparent to the user and not interfering in its
utilization.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yanjiao Chen .
A lot of effort has gone into RFID privacy. To mention
the most relevant solutions of the literature, Juels proposes
one-time pads transmitted across multiple authentication pro-
tocols [3]. Their successful use depends on the attacker not
being able to eavesdrop for a number of consecutive trans-
missions, appearing this as its main limitation. Garfinkel
proposes a strict regulation for the customer tracking (RFID
Bill of Rights) [4]. Nevertheless, this set of laws may be
only viable for some use cases, since it relies entirely on
legislation. Molnar and Wagner [5] for their part, propose
to decrease the tag identification time with a tree-based
tag scheme, even at the expense of considerably less pri-
vacy guarantees. More recently, Tu and Piramuthu [6] and
Korak and Hutter [7] addressed the relay attack, consisting
on the non-authorized use of the tag (identity theft) through
a man in the middle attack, resending the tag communication
while physically far from the target.
A common assumption in every proposed solution is that
the attacker, in his pursuit of breaking the privacy of the
protocol, is not capable to physically manipulate and tamper
the tags. Accessing the tags’ memory would mean accessing
secret keys, relevant state information and hence, the ability
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FIGURE 1. Scheme of operation: (a) Normal RFID tag; (b) Proposed Open tag; (c) Proposed Shorted tag.
of indistinguishably forge the tag. These situations are not
considered, or directly assumed that physically compromised
tags are out of the system. In this way, the RFID privacy
concerns of these models deal only with algorithmic attacks,
seeing the tag as a ‘‘black-box’’. The adversarial then has
prohibited to tamper with tags’ private information or to use
side-channel information to break the RFID security.
On the other side, Gassend et al. extended the RFID
privacy model to include hardware tampering attacks with
minimal hardware by means of physical unclonable func-
tions (PUFs) [8]. PUFs exploit physical characteristics of the
circuit, which are difficult tomodel even allowing the attacker
to have contact with the system.
In this paper, we focus on the high frequency (HF) band
(13.56 MHz) that can be implemented in many portable
devices, such as smartphones, tables or dataphones [9].
In fact, this broad use is a double-edged sword. On one side,
it generalizes the use of such technology and thus, the emer-
gence of new applications, contributing to the maturity of the
technology. On the other side, it makes easier the access to
the transmitted information through the wireless link, arising
methods to hack the protocols and/or devices. Therefore, it is
mandatory to come up with new and sophisticated strategies
to cope with these potential security risks.
In this contribution, we describe an extra hardware security
level for HF RFID tags. In particular, we include a force sen-
sor between the chip and antenna, so that the tag is unreadable
until it touches the reader with enough pressure normal to
its surface. In this direction, Marquardt et al. [10] described
different simple approaches to give awareness of the RFID
operation to the user. Specifically, they developed three kinds
of designs providing either visual, audible or vibro-tactile
feedback, although the last two options needed an extra
battery.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. DESCRIPTION OF OUR APPROACH
Our idea was to implement a button into the RFID antenna
that is open by default and closes the loop antenna on pres-
sure. To accomplish this, we modified the connection layer
between the inductor and the RFID chip, which is normally
developed by an insulator layer among the conductive traces
and on top a conductive line through insulator as well, as the
two points that are connected (see Figure 1a). In this work,
FIGURE 2. Schematics of the chip assembly process.
we did not place directly a conductive line between these
connections but instead, we deposited a matrix of cubes made
of silicone and glued to it a silver trace printed of a polymeric
foil (see Figure 1b). Therefore, once we want to activate our
RFID tagwe need to press on this arraywith a certain pressure
value to create the connection between chip and antenna that
allows the communication (see Figure 1c).
B. TAG FABRICATION
The silver (Ag) screen printing paste employed in this work
to print the antenna was LOCTITE ECI 1010 0.2KG E&C
by Henkel (Germany) used without modifications. The array
of cubes was made of screen-printed polydimethylsilox-
ane (PDMS). The isolating paste used to isolate the bridge
connecting the two ends of the inductor was TD-642 of
AppliedInkSolutions (US).
All pastes were printed onto thermally pre-heated (100◦C
for 30 min) polyethylene terephthalate (PET) Melinex 506 of
DuPont of a thickness of 100 µm. A manual screen printer
(Nino from Coruna, Switzerland) was used to print with a
screen with amesh density of 120 Threads/cm. After printing,
the pastes were dried at 100◦C for 30 min in an oven before
printing the next type of paste.
The assembly of the RFID chip to the foil was done in
a three-step process as depicted in Figure 2. First, H20E
conductive resin (Epoxy Technology Inc., Billerica, United
States) was deposited to interconnect the integrated circuit
(IC) and the screen printed silver pads. Double layer 50 µm-
thick dry adhesive (AR Clear 8932 fromAdhesives Research,
Inc. Glen Rock, Pennsylvania, United States) was located on
the bottom part of the IC to fix it to the substrate. Finally,
a heating step was performed in an oven at 120 ◦C for
20 min to cure the conductive resin. Additionally, the dry film
adhesion is enhanced with temperature, so the heat treatment
served also to fix it better to the substrate.
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FIGURE 3. a) Screen-printed one-chip RFID tag with a pressure-activated button. b) Magnification of chip and
pressure-sensing button.
C. TAG CHARACTERIZATION
A Keithley 2700 multimeter with 20 input channels was
used for measuring the resistances and open-circuit volt-
ages in the bending setup and in the thermocouple setup.
A Keithley 2602B source meter was employed in the ther-
mocouple setup. The LCR meter E4982A of Keysight was
employed for all capacitance measurements at an amplitude
of 1 V at a frequency of 100 kHz, if not indicated otherwise.
A calibration of the wires was done after each change of the
setup. The impedance analyzer E4990A was employed to
measure the frequency dependent response of the wireless
tags and an E5061B ENA Vector Network Analyzer of
Keyight for the S11 parameter measurements.
Sheet resistance measurements were conducted on a
printed 5 × 10 mm2 area with a self-made linear four-
point probe in combination with a Keysight B2900 source
meter or a Keithley 2700 multimeter. A correction factor
of 0.651 was calculated for the 5× 10 mm2 areas and applied
to compensate the effect of limited boundaries according to
Smits [11]. Profilometer studies were done with a Dektak
XT of Bruker (US) with the micro-porous vacuum chuck that
holds flexible samples flat.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We investigated the use of our thin pressure sensors without
a dielectric as they are pressed at a certain pressure. The
implementation in a HF RFID tag is shown in Figure 3a with
a magnification of the RFID chip and the sensor in Figure 3b.
The latter shows the structured dielectric as dots around and
between the contact areas of the bridge to the bottom contact
wired to the chip, closing the circuit.
Preliminary results show that the button works as intended
and changes from a capacitance of about 17.5 pF to a resis-
tor of about 0.8  at the desired frequency of 13.56 MHz
(see Figure 4). The latter should not have a large influence on
the antenna behavior as intended, working close to an ideal
closed switch even for HF signals. The first one however,
FIGURE 4. Capacitance (when the button is OFF) and resistance (when
the button is pressed at 10 mN), over the frequency range from
100 Hz to 20 MHz.
introduces a second large capacitance next to the internal one
into the microcontroller and leads to a decoupling between
the reader and antenna. Thus, it acts in practice as an ideal
open switch, not allowing the signal to get in the microcon-
troller and therefore not permitting the communication.
We used a FR4 antenna as reader, resonating at approxi-
mately 13.56 MHz, and brought the safe tag close to it, press-
ing the button with a plastic clamp at two different distances
(as shown in Figure 5).We tested two copper antennas as well
as reference, whose responses with the reader can be seen
in Figure 5 (copper1 and copper2) with a resonance frequency
in both cases about 14 MHz.
When the HF tag is placed in the reader surroundings,
the antiresonance of the reader antenna disappears. In partic-
ular, when the button was pressed, the matching of the char-
acteristic impedance was achieved at resonance frequency
of 13.56 MHz. On the other side, if the clamp was removed
and the button was not pressed, a shift in the resonance
frequency of the circuit appeared of more than 1 MHz. This
should reliably inhibit the coupling of the reader and the tag
and not permit non-intended communications, since the RFID
chip would not be able to operate.
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FIGURE 5. Coupling of a copper HF reader with two reference copper
antennas and the printed tag. Tag without (off) and with (on) pressure in
the button at distances of 2 and 4 cm.
Apart from providing extra hardware security to the RFID
communication, our developed switch gives a threshold pres-
sure value of around 10 mN. New use-cases emerge from
tags that only activate when certain pressure is applied to the
objective, security aside. Goods differentiation or energy sav-
ings in case of battery-assisted tags can be as well achieved.
IV. CONCLUSION
We demonstrated how a pressure-sensitive button imple-
mented in an RFID tag can increase its security by inhibiting
unwanted readings. In other words, through the combination
of a NFC tag with an imperceptible printed security button,
we allow data transfers only when the button is pressed
with a certain level of pressure. This merges the comfort
of a wireless tag like a credit card or an access batch, with
additional security against tracking, relay attack or eaves-
dropping. The inclusion on current solutions as thementioned
ones would be indubitably straightforward. Besides, adding
that antenna, circuitry and button are screen printed, results
in a greatly convenient and inexpensive solution for a secu-
rity boost in several use cases, not implying changes in the
firmware or communication protocols, nor the inclusion of
more components to the system.
To conclude, we enhanced the security and, in last term pri-
vacy, of RFID tags. Although still assuming that the attacker
is not able to physically manipulate the tag as most of the
literature; we went further than most of the current solutions
not considering only the protocol algorithmic, but as well its
physical nature and interaction in realistic scenarios, without
compromising the energetic autonomy of the tag.
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